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The question:  
 
‘No Man is an Island’, but… what is an Island? 
 
Introduced by Andrea Caligiuri and Enrico Milano 
 
Islands in international law are a mixed blessing. On one hand, they 
may significantly augment the sovereign and jurisdictional rights of 
States, in particular over vast amounts of marine space. On the other, 
they pose complex problems concerning determination of their nature, 
whether they are considered alone (Natural or manmade? Islands or 
rocks? Full, half or no effect?) or whether they are considered as groups 
(Archipelagos or not?). Following the, mostly incidental, treatment of is-
lands in a number of international law cases, principally concerned with 
delimitation of maritime boundaries, the Award of 12 July 2016 rendered 
by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with UNCLOS Annex 
VII in the South China Sea Arbitration between The Philippines and 
China (the China/Philippines Award or the Award)1 has eventually fo-
cused on these features, addressing a number of issues that arise from 
their existence, dimension and location. 
Possibly the most innovative and significant feature of the 
China/Philippines Award has been the decision over the contested nature 
of a number of maritime features in the South China Sea under Chinese 
control. Despite its non-appearance in the proceedings, China claimed 
that those features should be qualified as ‘islands’, hence generating ex-
tensive maritime entitlements, including an exclusive economic zone and 
a continental shelf. The issue revolved around the interpretation and ap-
plication of Article 121 UNCLOS, which states at paragraph 1 that ‘[a]n 
island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide’; and adds at paragraph 3 that ‘[r]ocks which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have 
 
1 South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic 
of China) PCA case no 2013-19 (Award of 12 July 2016) <https://pcacases.com/ 
web/sendAttach/2086>. 
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no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf’. The Award represents 
the first judicial interpretation of the above provision and goes at great 
length and depth in its interpretation. Due to that, the case can be made 
that the relevance of the Award is not limited to the dispute between The 
Philippines and China, but it extends to numerous disputed geographical 
features at sea worldwide, including those subject to significant reclama-
tion activities by States. 
Another issue that was addressed, albeit to a lesser extent, by the Tri-
bunal concerned the notion of ‘archipelago’.2 In paragraph 573 of the 
Award, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that a continental country which has 
oceanic islands does not enjoy the legal status of archipelagic State. 
Therefore, the principles in Part IV UNCLOS do not apply to the oce-
anic archipelagos belonging to continental States. This simple statement 
seems not to fully account for the much more complex issue at its basis. 
As it is known, the rights to be applied to oceanic archipelagos belonging 
to continental States attracted certain attention at UNCLOS III. How-
ever, the final version of UNCLOS leaves the issue out. Although 
UNCLOS avoided giving explicit arrangements for oceanic archipelagos 
belonging to continental States, in practice, some continental States have 
used similar measures reflected in Part IV in drawing the baselines for 
their oceanic archipelagos before and after UNCLOS III.3 It has been 
stated that the limitation indicated in Part IV UNCLOS – the principles 
of archipelagic States including archipelagic baselines only apply to ar-
chipelagic States – ‘seems an unnecessary and unreasonable restriction’4 
and that the recognition by other States of the practice of continental 
 
2 China’s view is that it extends its sovereignty to Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands] in 
its entirety, not just some features thereof and that as a single unity under China’s sover-
eignty, ‘Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and Continental Shelf’ (see Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No CML/8/2011 
(14 April 2011) <www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ 
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf>. 
3 These States include Ecuador (with Galápagos Islands), Denmark (with Faroe 
Islands), Norway (with Svalbard Islands), Spain (with Canary Islands), and Portugal (with 
Azores Islands). 
4 R Churchill, V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester UP 1999) 120. 
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States in using straight baselines to draw their baselines around their oce-
anic archipelagos ‘must be regarded as being valid under customary in-
ternational law’.5 
We have invited two distinguished law of the sea scholars to discuss 
whether the interpretation rendered by the Tribunal is persuasive with 
regard to the dispute in the South China Sea and one that will prove au-
thoritative and influential on present and future cases and disputes, 
thereby contributing to certainty and stability in the law of the sea. Rele-
vant questions to be considered are the Tribunal’s resort to Article 31 
VCLT’s interpretive tools; the relationship between ‘human habitation’ 
and ‘economic life of their own’ in the qualification of geographical fea-
tures; the question of the ‘critical date’ on which an assessment over the 
two conditions must be made; the impact of reclamation activities, such 
as those conducted by China, over the qualification of a geographical fea-
ture as rock or island; the significance of the finding on archipelagos in 
light of present State practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 ibid 121. 
